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SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (SECOND SERIES). By Randolph E.
Paul. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1938. Pp. 447.
FIRST, a description of the contents of this admirable book. Continuing the
method adopted in his earlier volume," Mr. Paul has selected several carefully
delimited phases of our tax lav for scrutiny in a series of essays. The first
relates to the effect of local rules of property on Federal taxation. While the
underlying base of the Federal income tax is nation-wide uniformity, there
are many instances in which the "uniform" rule is that the State law shall be
conclusive, so that the application of the rule produces diverse results. Thus,
there are situations in which State lawv is made controlling by express Federal
statutory language, as the inclusion of a merger or consolidation pursuant to
State law in the definition of a reorganization, or by judicial interpretation of
the Federal statute, as in Unitcd States v. Cambridge Loan & Building
Company,- applying State law to determine whether the taxpayer was a
building and loan association. Speaking generally, in most of the situations
in which the Federal statute uses language which would be given a different
construction in the various States, the courts have adopted a "Federal" inter-
pretation in the interests of uniformity. But of necessity there are many
instances, in addition to those specified in the Federal statute, in which State
law must play a part. The owner of property is taxable on its income;
A and B are contesting the ownership of W, hiteacre; the State law will deter-
mine this controversy and therefore the tax liability. A contrary approach
would necessitate either precise definition of hundreds of terms in the revenue
acts or the judicial development of a comprehensive Federal common law;
the former is fanciful, the latter was in reality rejected in Erie Railroad Com-
pany v. Tompkins.3 Where the necessary reliance upon State law results in
important economic unfairness, however, it would seem incumbent upon the
Congress to restore economic uniformity. The community property situation
provides a ready example.
The second essay considers the lack of administrative machinery for the
compromise of a tax liability which, though certain, involves sufficient elements
of unfairness to move the Government to forego all or a portion of the tax.
While Section 3229 of the Revised Statutes, now Section 3761 of the Internal
Revenue Code, and Section 3469 of the Revised Statutes, authorize Treasury
Department compromise of tax liabilities, the Attorney General has ruled
that this authority exists only where there is a doubt as to the "legality of
the claim of the Government or tie collectibility thereof," so that these provi-
sions are of little aid. The authorization to enter into closing agreements is
likewise said to be of no assistance, as it vests the Commissioner with the
power finally to close cases but not with any new power of compromise.
Finally, attention is called to the provisions of Section 1108(a) of the 1926
1. PAUL, STUDIES Ix FEamFt. TAXATION (1937).
2. 278 U. S. 55 (1928).
3. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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Act, as amended, now Section 3791 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, grant-
ing power to make non-retroactive regulations and thereby to grant the relief
in question to classes of taxpayers. There is an interesting discussion of the
constitutionality of this seldom-considered provision, and analogy is made to
the inherent power of a court to provide for the non-retroactive application
of its decisions.4 The author concludes that except for the informal compromise
that occurs in give-and-take settlements, there is no adequate device for per-
mitting these equitable compromises and argues that this defect should be
remedied.
The subject of res judicata is the concern of the third essay. The major
portion of this essay is devoted to a detailed exposition of the decided cases.
But. it is the conclusion, unhappily all too short, which forms the vital part
of the chapter, for here is discussed the absorbing question of just what
should be the role of res judicata in an income tax system resting upon an
annual basis. Is the rigid certainty which res judicata achieves for the indi-
vidual taxpayer a desideratum in a field in which judicial interpretation is
constantly subject to change? Can it be said that it reduces litigation if it
forces the taxpayer or Government to litigate to a finish the case which is to
be the binding adjudication? And does it not unmercifully subject taxpayer
and Government to the vagaries of "certiorari denied"? United States v.
Stone & Downer Coinpany,5 sanctioning a disregard of res judicata by the
Court of Customs Appeals, stands as a reminder that due process does not
demand obedience to the rule of res judicata. The author hesitantly, for he is
well aware of the uncharted seas, suggests that the courts should be author-
ized "to relax the rule of res judicata in meritorious cases upon a showing of
additional or different facts or a new rule of law which might reasonably
affect the result." The reviewer without hesitance, for the suggestion is always
a safe one, feels that the subject merits hard study before a desirable solution
can be adopted. The problem is not confined to judicial litigation; in slightly
different form it is perhaps the chief obstacle to administrative declaratory
rulings, as a system of binding rulings if widely applied might well produce
an extensive and undesirable lack of uniformity.
The fourth essay cautiously ventures into the domain of "earnings and
profits." Cautiously, for it deals in the main only with the interpretative
questions of whether unrealized appreciation in value of corporate property
and realized but not recognized appreciation in value constitute earnings or
profits within the meaning of Section 115. The author's answer is in the
negative; his analysis of the case law establishes the inconclusiveness of the
existing decisions. The complexity of the transactions involved and the judi-
cial failure to distinguish between the constitutional power of Congress and
its statutory command have combined to produce this result. It is to be
hoped that succeeding essays will probe deeper into the subject of earnings
and profits. The taxation of corporate distributions revolves around this
4. Since the publication of this book, the Supreme Court has apparently indicated
its approval of the section, but has given it a peculiar twist in stating that primarily It
constitutes the Congressional authorization to the Treasury Department to make its
regulations retroactive. Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 423 (1939).
5. 274 U. S. 225 (1927).
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essentially undefined term. The courts are only now commencing really to
grapple with the problems it presents. Perhaps later essays will evaluate the
need for the concept. Assuming a corporate tax not concerned with undis-
tributed profits, would abandonment of the concept and taxation as dividends
of all non-liquidating distributions achieve a simplicity that is not inequitable
to the stockholder?
The fifth essay, on "Step Transactions", considers a phase of tax law which,
as in other fields, causes taxpayers and the Government, dependent upon who
is victor and vanquished, either to applaud or decry the workings of the
judicial mind, though both will unite in marvelling at the subtleties of which
it is capable. Should a single transaction, which if looked at as a whole pro-
duces no tax, be broken up into its constituent parts and a tax liability thereby
determined? Or, from the other perspective, should a series of separate steps
be integrated into one transaction? We are here in the realm where one day
the god of' "form"' is in the ascendency, so that a literal application of the
taxing statute is sanctioned, the chips falling where they may, and where next
day the god of "substance" reigns, with the result that a broad "realism" is
said necessarily to underlie the application of the statute. Recognizing that
the traditional form-substance test is unsatisfactory, the author carefully sets
forth the various factors which from time to time have played a part in the
judicial language used in these cases, and borrowing from a decision of
Cardozo in a contract case, urges the test of "interdependency"-are the nomi-
nally separate steps mutually interdependent in that while each in another
setting would have a significance standing alone, in this setting they are com-
ponent parts of a different transaction which constitutes the whole of which
each step is but a part? The complex situations involved in recent Supreme
Court cases on this subject, Helverng v. Tex-Pcnn Oil Company,c Helvcring
v. Bashford,7 and Helvcring v. Gromans are then analyzed from this view-
point.
The sixth essay deals with the factors of motive and intent in Federal tax
law. Appearing originally in "Psychiatry", and thus perhaps offering the
converse of justice Cardozo's remark "Psychoanalysis has spread to unac-
customed fields," it offers a descriptive summary of the instances in the Federal
tax law in which the intent or motive of the taxpayer is critical-Section 102
cases, gfts in contemplation of death, the Greqorv case,0 and so on. The con-
clusion cautions those who ask, generally sight unseen, for objective tests to
displace this present reliance upon subjective factors. The final essay, by
Muriel S. Paul, is a trim discussion of the question whether cash or property
received by a successful will contestant is taxable income. The author con-
cludes: probably yes, in both the constitutional and statutory sense, with the
scales just about evenly balanced as to the second. After tle book was pub-
lished, the Supreme Court in Lyeth v. Hoeya0 tipped tie scales in favor of
the taxpayer by construing Section 22 (b) (3), exempting property acquired by
6. 300 U. S. 481 (1937).
7. 302 U. S. 454 (1938).
S. 302 U. S. 82 (1938).
9. 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
10. 59 Sup. Ct. 155 (1938).
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gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, to extend to the receipt of property by
an heir consequent upon the compromise of a will contest.
We may turn to the importance of this volume. Along with scattered
articles in the law reviews and Professor Magill's "Taxable Income", the
two volumes of studies by the author represent practically the entire body of
legal literature offering a critical analysis of Federal income tax law. There
are to be sure many texts and practitioner's handbooks, but even the best of
these are devoted almost entirely to describing the statutory and case law in
terms of what Congress and the courts have said, so that the not too informed
tax practitioner may read and run. A: a consequence, our tax law is woefully
in need of searching examination. The present revenue acts are fearsome and
wonderful things. Start to tinker with a subparagraph in one section and you
will find yourself hanging to a line that weaves in and out of countless other
sections. Complexity is all too apparent, and yet even those who preach the
stock creed of simplicity can hardly fail to realize in moments of more sober
reflection that complexity is necessary, for better or for worse. Changes so
frequent as to be bewildering serve to remind us that many of the most im-
portant phases of our tax structure are anchorless. Now you take your capital
loss, now you can't; now you tax a corporation this way, now that way; now
you see it, now you don't. But unlike the barker at the county fair, the Con-
gressional barker is just as much at a loss as the guessing taxpayer as to which
shell the pea will be under the next time.
The necessity today for impartial, hard, really scientific tax research is
overwhelming. There is hardly an import--nt phase of our tax law that would
not benefit from close analysis. Cancellation of indebtedness, assumption of
indebtedness, earnings and profits, the reorganization sections, the structure
of the estate tax and its relation to the gift tax, to mention but a few, raise
problems for which a permanent solution has yet to be found. The Treasury
Department is not in a position alone to cope with the problems-the daily
grist will not permit its experts to closet themselves for long in tax labora-
tories. The Tax Committees of the various associations have not been equal
to the task. Moreover, the approach must not proceed from preconceived
postulates. The taxpayers who believe in the cartoonist's grasping Uncle Sam
with his hand in the taxpayer's pocket, and those persons in the Government
or elsewhere who are firmly convinced that every little boy or gal is born
with the ambition to incorporate a yacht or to organize a foreign holding
company must be left behind. It is up to the law school professors and the
enlightened tax attorneys (ex hypothesi law school professors are enlightened),
in cooperation with the Treasury Department, to undertake the job. If they




tAssistant Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Department.
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THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. By Sir Peter Benson Maxwell. Eighth
Edition. By Sir Gilbert H. B. Jackson. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1937.
Pp. cxii, 380.
MAXWELL on the Interpretation of Statutes is a "standard" book. That is
to say, ever since its first publication in 1875 it has been frequently used by
lawyers in England and the British dominions to guide them in what they
should say when they wished to persuade a court to adopt their construction
of a statute.
It is a "standard" book in another sense. It follows a definite pattern of
books on the Interpretation of Statutes. It begins with a chapter that stresses
the ipsissinza verba of statutes and it goes on to successive chapters which
discuss the circumstances under which the object in view, justice and reason,
principles of strict and liberal constructions, implied intentions and harmony
of legislation, may be taken into account, when the ipsissina v crba are not
overwhelmingly definite.
While, therefore, the book may be said to belong to an easily recognizable
type, it should at once be said that it is an excellent example of its type.
It is concisely written, it is amply supplied with cases that illustrate the points
it makes, it has a full index. The pitfalls that Latin phrases furnish to the
proof-reader are more successfully avoided than is the case in most American
books. Still there is de circuinspecte agatis on p. 224. There is a table of
cases that occupies no less than 104 pages. But there is no list of statutes,
which is a curious omission. A table of cases is of doubtful utility in a book
of this sort, whereas a table of statutes would be instructive. The book,
however, is a useful, compact and well-printed manual-in the literal sense
of the word-and doubtless neither its original author nor any of its six
successive editors had anything else in mind.
But those who would like really to be guided in understanding statutes or
those who seek to determine to what extent a statute does in fact make law,
will get as little help from this book as from other books of its class. The
fundamental objection to all of them lies in the practice they follow of setting
one rule by the side of another that contradicts or qualifies it, and trusting to
the mere juxtaposition to secure the necessary adjustments. When Lord
Loreburn says: "We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament,
unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act,"'
what the inquiring mind desires is a gauge or test wherewith to discover
when the reason is clear enough. And when we have such a statement as
"Words in statutes are not infrequently construed in their popular and not
in their technical meaning," (p. 50) we are tempted to ask: "How frequently?
And when ?" Especially since in the illustration the word construed does not
have a popular meaning at all.
Examples may be multiplied. A general act does not repeal a particular
act (p. 156), as duly authenticated by a Latin brocard. But a few pages later
(p. 160) it is declared that if there be good reason to suppose that the par-
ticular act was intended to be repealed, "the maxim ceases to be applicable."
The rule of ejusdem generis is a good rule, but it is to be rejected when there
1. Vickers v. Evans, 79 L. J. 954, 955 (K. B. 1910), citcd p. 13.
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are "adequate grounds" for doing so, discoverable from a "wider inspection
of the scope of legislation." (p. 293). The only thing omitted is any hint of
a test of adequacy. Flat contradiction does not irk the standardized inter-
preter. "Statutes which encroach on the rights of the subject," we are told
on excellent authority, "should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect
such rights." (p. 249). How can that be done? Again, it is "reasonable to
presume" that the same meaning is implied in the use of the same expression.
(p. 276). And a few lines further it is declared that "the presumption is not
of much weight." May we reasonably presume on the one hand and deny
weight to our reasonableness on the other? Apparently this sort of thing is
taken in stride by properly trained interpreters.
The difficulty inherent in any theory of statutory interpretation is the
difficulty inherent in human speech. We are dealing with words, phrases,
sentences, paragraphs, and the least analysis makes evident that these words
can never unequivocally describe a situation, either one that is assumed to
have existed or one it is hoped will come into existence. Often nothing more
is indicated by an elaborate description than a general sense of direction.
In the words that are found in statutes this incapacity of language to take
the place of actual experience is even more clearly apparent than in ordinary
speech or in literary expression. In both of the latter there is a large context
of living facts or-in the case of books-an almost unlimited context of
explanation and illustration. But statutes are collections of words torn out
of the larger context of life or discourse which occasioned them and only
rarely has this fact been compensated for by care in phrasing. It is assumed
that there are definite situations which the framers of the statute had in mind.
It needs a trained literary capacity to enable these situations to be seen if
they are past and it takes a real imaginative power to create them if they
are contemplated in the future.
Both types of capacity are often lacking in the framers of statutes. Or-
dinarily, however, they are aware of the purpose of the legislation although
what is called the purpose is rarely more than the direction in which the
proponents of the statute wish to move. At various times in the history of
statute-making it was customary to declare the purpose in set terms-a custom
which has recently been revived in American statutes. But whether the pur-
pose is declared or not, it is surrounded by a great many limiting or enlarging
words and while these words are colored by the known or explicitly asserted
purpose, they have an independent value.
In ordinary human discourse, the general purpose we announce permits
us to disregard any suggestions that may deflect our conduct. But in statutes,
since the word is inescapably there, we often get a feeling of a confused mass
of sign-boards pointing in a jumble of contradictory directions. This is
rendered even more confusing by the fact that the statute normally uses
generalities. It is not a single situation involving specifically named men
that is to be regulated, but a group, a class, a category, of situations. And
these classes are of varying inclusiveness. Sometimes we have an enormously
large generality, as when we speak of "acts in restraint of trade", "fraudulent
representations", "net income", and sometimes we contemplate a single and
unique event, as in many private bills.
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"Interpretation" involves the task of detennining a maximum and minimum
of inclusiveness. Any interpretation that remains within these limits is per-
missible, even according to accepted canons. Just where the line will be
drawn depends on considerations of convenience, of equity, of uniformity
of legislation, of harmony of decisions. And once the line has been drawn,
Aaxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, or some similar treatise, will
furnish rules and cases to justify it according to one "canon" or another.
The interpretation that transcends the minimum or maximum is one that
flatly disregards or contradicts the wording of the statute. Such interpreta-
tions have been made, although it is vehemently asserted by courts and text-
writers that they must never be made. If, however, we do wish to disregard
our lines of minimum and maximum inclusiveness, we shall not have far to
seek for authority to do so. faxwell on Interpretation will furnish it. We
may turn to p. 110 and find that Section 17 of the Stamnp Act of 1S70 (c. 97)
was disregarded because to enforce it "wbuld introduce the greatest difficulty
in the administration of justice." It is regrettably true that the administration
of justice is beset with difficulties, but if we take the canons at their word,
that ought not be a reason for overriding a statute. Again, a "single woman"
(p. 62) has been held to include a married woman living apart from her
husband, although on pp. 13-16 we are informed that we may not fill up
omissions in statutes even if we think the omission was inadvertent. Once
more, a statute of 1869 declares that certain acts are "null and void to al
intents and purposes whatsoever." But that does not prevent these acts-
following reputable canons of interpretation-from being perfectly good for
some purposes (p. 187).
All this merely points the moral that our "canons" can be used only when
we have already got our interpretation in mind, i.e., when we have drawn the
line of inclusion between the maximum and minimum of generality contained
in the statutory statement. We may be sure of one thing. The canons will
not draw the line for us, although etymologically that is what a canon ought
to do.
Books on statutory interpretation are bound to be misleading except for
the practical use which has already been indicated. They cannot help it
because they are themselves misled by their most common presupposition.
Most of them begin with a statement very much like that of the opening sen-
tence of this book. "A statute is the will of the legislature and . . . is to
to be expounded 'according to the intent of them that made it.'" This, of
course, is pure mythology. A "legislature" is an abstraction which does not
exist and accordingly can have as little will as it can have intent. A statute
is a statement in a printed book which can be safely assumed in nearly every
case to be exactly like a statement on an engrossed parchment somewhere
in the public records. Somebody-or some group of somebodies--wrote it
out originally, but these somebodies were flesh and blood persons and not
abstractions at all. They probably had "will" and "intentions" and it is not
beyond the bounds of possibility that their will and intentions are discoverable.
Ordinarily-not always-we are warned that their will and intentions are
quite irrelevant and that we must substitute for them the imaginary will of
a fabulous animal, the "Legislature". This is not an exercise in logic or law
but in creative imagination.
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The accepted canons of interpretation of statutes are in many instances
derived from the rules of interpretation that were originally applied to texts
of the Bible. Professor Thurman Arnold in an important and entertaining
article has shown how closely the methods of theology and law resemble each
other in respect of interpretation.2 But theologians had an excuse that lawyers
do not possess. They were bound to think of their texts as the utterance of
an omniscient and infallible Being and were, therefore, justified in assuming
that every word-even every letter- was fraught with a vital and subtle
meaning. Whatever may be said in defense of modern legislation, there is
one thing that will not be said-that it is divinely inspired.
If we attend to realities, we shall take cognizance of the actual process
of legislating. A statute is worded by a man or a group of men whose inten-
tions are ascertainable but without much significance. It is then presented to
one or more bodies of official persons elected for that purpose, to be approved
or rejected by voting "Aye" or "No". It is extremely rare that when the vote
is taken, all those who vote in the majority have actually in mind all the words
of the statute or even the substance of all the provisions of it. When the statute
is finally adopted it exercises a directive force upon the administrators and
judges who are to apply it. Every application involves an "interpretation",
because it requires the administrator or judge to draw the line between maxi-
mum and minimum of generality in such a way as to include or exclude the
case before him.
The function of interpreting is part of the duty imposed on the administrator
or judge ratione officii. He cannot evade or refuse it. And I cannot feel that
he will make effective use of books on statutory interpretation until he has,
at least tentatively, drawn his line.
What gives this book and others of its class their permanent value is that
they supply the lawyer with the language which must be used when he seeks
to justify or to reject a particular interpretation. This language is a dialect
of English which can be learned like other languages, and for which there
should be grammars and dictionaries. It is an essential part of a lawyer's
training. The language of realism is offensive to persons accustomed to wordls
like "restrictive" and "liberal construction", "intention of the legislature",
"equity of the statute"--incidentally "equity" in this strange but indispensable
tongue, is exactly the same as "mischief"I (p. 223)-and many similar locu-
tions. But as far as the practising lawyer is concerned, any other language
except this is worse than offensive. It is non-persuasive, and persuasion is his
purpose.
The language of interpretation is quite as much a separate tongue as Law-
French was and there are doubtless persons who will think as Roger North
did of French, that the law cannot be stated in any other language. I should not
like to dispute the assertion. Probably the best course is to make a statement
privately for one's own benefit in the language of common sense and reality,
and then translate it into the terms necessitated by "canons of interpretation."
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes may be recommended as an excel-
lent guide for that purpose. MAx RADIN t
Berkeley, California.
2. Apologia For Jurisprudence (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 729.
tProfessor of Law, University of California School of Jurisprudence.
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EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL. By Edward J. McCullen. New York: Baker,
Voorhis & Co., 1938. Pp. -xxix, 1110. $15.
THE AUTHOR of this book has been for many years the librarian of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York in the First Judicial Department,
and, therefore, has had an excellent opportunity to study pre-trial procedure
in New York. His book is the first treatise dealing solely with the New York
practice of discovery and presents a thorough-going work on the subject. Part
I is entitled "The Remedy" and considers the nature and development of
discovery, the courts in which examinations may be had, the persons subject
to examination, the actions or special proceedings in which examinations may
be had, and the right to examine before trial under various circumstances.
Part II, "The Procedure", deals with the mechanics of obtaining, modifying
or vacating an examination before trial. A separate chapter tinder Part II
discusses examinations under the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.
Part III, entitled "The Examination", is devoted to the conduct of an exam-
ination before trial. Questions are suggested for use on examinations in
forty-six different forms of actions. Many of the questions are taken from
reported cases and the text contains numerous comments and practical sug-
gestions. The book is also replete with helpful forms culled chiefly from
actual cases.
The author has gathered together most of the leading New York cases on
the question of discovery and has presented the subject in a very readable
style. Several relevant decisions, however, should be added.'
Explicit cross references would have been preferable to mere statements
that the particular subject is treated elsewhere in the volume. The index,
however, is well prepared and little difficulty should be encountered in finding
the matter under investigation. In view of the many cases on discovery
decided each year, a pocket supplement would have been very helpful.
This book constitutes a substantial contribution to the study of an im-
portant subject. It should prove to be a very handy and helpful quick-reference
volume for the active practitioner in New York and an exceedingly valuable
one to the less experienced or younger practitioner. It should also be con-
sulted in conjunction with Dyer-Smith's recently published "Federal Exam-
inations before Trial and Deposition Practice" when considering the liberal
discovery provisions in the new Federal Rules of Procedure.
In studying Mr. McCullen's book, the reader is impressed with the fact
that the discovery procedure in New York has changed little since the enact-
ment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1876. True, the Civil Practice Act
adopted in 1921 was hailed as a forward-looking step in procedural reform,
but it must be conceded that the changes in the subject of discovery were
largely in the mechanics to be used and not in the scope of the examination
1. See, in connection with the discussion of the question whetler an e.amination
before trial of a defendant may be used against a co-defendant (p. 458), Freisinger v.
Reibach, 254 App. Div. 575 (2d Dep't 1938). Furtlermore, Zecechini v. .Mayer, 195 App.
Div. 423 (lst Dep't 1921) (describing the normal sequence to be "the bill of particulars
first and examination before trial second"--a rule not followed very often), and Matter
of feyers, 158 Misc. 942 (1936) (Surrogate Foley holding the sequence stated in the
Zecchini case reversed in will contests) appear to have been omitted.
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before trial. There have been some amendments but the fundamental principles
have remained substantially the same. It is still the so-called general rule
that the courts usually restrict examinations of adverse parties to matters
upon which the examining party has the burden of proof. This, of course, is
a relic of the old chancery procedure which only permitted the discovery, by
way of written interrogatories, of such evidence which the pleader would have
to obtain in support of his own case, and did not permit a discovery of his
opponent's case. The same restriction, with even further limitations, is applied
to the examination of witnesses. We still find the existence of the traditional
hostility to the "fishing expedition", a term applied to all attempts to discover
the evidence which the adverse party intends to offer.
It is true that certain of the judicial departments in New York State have
been more liberal in allowing examinations before trial; but the First Depart-
ment, which embraces the County of New York, where most of the litigation
is found, still adheres strictly, as a matter of discretion, to the rule that a
party may only have an examination before trial on the matters concerning
which he has the affirmative. Such a rule creates a decided inequality of
discovery in New York. Thus a plaintiff is allowed far greater rights to
discovery than is a defendant since the former usually has the affirmative of
most of the issues. Where a defendant only pleads a general denial, he is,
in the ordinary case, ipso facto denied an examination before trial. This has
occurred in many instances in stockholders' suits, which have been brought
with increasing frequency in the past few years. The contention usually
advanced is that enlarged discovery would encourage perjury. It is difficult,
however, to see how an examination which is mutual and broad enough to
bring out all the facts would produce such a result.
2
Mr. McCullen is fully aware of this defect in the New York procedure and
is in accord with the efforts of the Judicial Council of the State of New York
to revise the procedure for taking depositions before trial so that all parties
will be subject, in the discretion of the court, to examinations before trial
regardless of who has the affirmative of the issues. Such a procedural reform
has been adopted in the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
permit an examination as to all matters, not privileged, relevant to the sub-
ject-matter involved in the pending action both for the purposes of discovery
and for use as evidence.
In this connection it is not inappropriate to quote from Professor E. R.
Sunderland, a member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Procedure.
"It is probable that no procedural process offers greater oppor-
tunity for increasing the efficiency of the administration of justice
than that of discovery before trial. Much of the delay in the prepara-
tion of a case, most of the lost effort in the course of the trial, and a
large part of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from the want of
information on the part of the litigants and their counsel as to the
2. William Howard Taft said: "There is no objection that I know, why each party




real nature of the respective claims and the facts upon which they
rest. "3
Mr. McCullen's book shows that the legislature and the courts of New York
have not yet come to this conclusion.
WERER ILSEXt
New York City.
CASES ON PERSONAL PROPERTY. By V. Lewis Roberts. Chicago: Callaghan
and Company, 1938. Pp. 588.
THIs is the first unit in the new National Casebook property series. It is
a companion volume to Brown's A Treatise on the Law of Personal Properly.
Both the arrangement of the book and the division of material between it and
later volumes are traditional. -Much of the book seems to be based on the
assumption that teachers, bored, will appreciate having the usual note cases
printed in full and the often-taught cases reduced to notes. Professor Roberts
does have many interesting recent cases. His zeal for late date lines has,
however, tended to make the book informative and descriptive rather than
thought-provoking. He has sacrificed the clash of legal reasoning to secure
modern variation in fact patterns.
The book is badly out of balance. Out of a total of 585 pages of cases, only
155 pages are devoted to the chapter on fixtures and the four chapters and ten
sections on acquisition and transfer of title to chattels, including finding, ad-
verse possession, judicial sale, satisfaction of judgment in conversion, accession,
gifts, and so on. But the three chapters in the bailment group, including liens
and pledges, are given 435 pages. As much space is given to statutory mechan-
ic's liens, for example, as to the whole subject of fixtures. Professor Roberts
justifies this shift in emphasis by citing the change in types of personal prop-
erty since the horse and buggy days. But the modern courses in torts, sales,
negotiable instruments, and security transactions have been framed on the basis
of this change, and they embrace most of the problems raised in these three
chapters except the basic ones about possession and delivery.
A first course in property, it seems to me, should constitute either an his-
torical or an analytical introduction to the field-or at least furnish a sound
basis on which to build. A course based on a book of this length will represent
one-half or one-third of the work in property elected by many law students.
It is bad enough to spend this share of the time on the hodge-podge which
constitutes the usual course in personal property, but it is worse to dilute the
property content of the course further by dwelling, for example, on the degrees
of care owed by the various bailees, on the intricacies of attorneys' retaining
and charging liens, and on the variation in late commercial security devices.
At the 1935 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, the
property group discussed the arrangement of materials. It was the consensus
3. RAGLAxD, DIscoVERY BEFoRE TRIAL (1932) iii.
tMfember of the New York Bar.
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of opinion that the traditional course in personal property was not satisfactory.
Some suggested its elimination; others its modification or combination with
other courses. Since then curriculum changes in several key schools indicate
a speeding up in property courses. I am afraid that both the editor and the
publisher have missed the trend.
RUSSELL DENIsON NILESf
New York City.
CHAPTER X. By Luther D. Swanstrom. Chicago: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1938. Pp. 473. $10.00.
IN ONE way this book should prove a useful addition to the library of every
lawyer, containing as it does a full reprint of the Chandler Act of 1938 as well
as reprints of Sections 75, 77 and 77B, and devoting more than half of its
pages to reprinting "The Law", old as well as new. Apart from these features,
for which ten dollars seems a disproportionate price, the volume has little
to recommend it. Like most books written within a few months of the enact-
ment of a law, it is largely repertorial and historical in style, being in the
main limited to reviews of cases under the old act and to summaries and
restatements of the new statute. The textual material is primarily concerned
with procedure under Section 77B. The availability of antiquarian material,
useful as it is because of the continuity of practice and the force of com-
parison and contrast, has caused the author to omit consideration of vital,
pressing problems under Chapter Ten itself. Thus, while more than thirty
pages are devoted to the restatement of administrative provisions of Chapter
Ten, little analytical reference is made to really fundamental problems, such
as the selection of competent, disinterested trustees. Even more glaring is
the casual, cursory nod given the Securities and Exchange Commission in a
few lines of a chapter on Parties, Pleading and Practices. Significant questions
attending the Commission's practices and procedures are completely over-
looked or ignored. Shall the Commission be able to conduct hearings? Shall
it be able to undertake independent investigations, as it was able to do under
the. bill passed by the House, or shall the Senate's excision of the word "in-
vestigation" be construed as a denial of the Commission's right to investigate?
Was the Senate's action simply an expression of allergy to "investigation" or
does it reflect a desire to avoid burdening the Commission with mandatory
investigations in every case?
Likewise, in the author's discussion of the Boyd case1 and the different
priority theories, the attitude of the Commission is not mentioned, The
IProfessor of Law, New York University.
1. Northern Pacific R. R. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913). In this review, the term
"absolute priority" is used to embrace a scheme in which senior security holders must
receive full recognition before subordinate classes are permitted participation; "relative
priority" is used to suggest a plan in which the relative superiority of senior securities
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S. E. C. had not, of course, at the time the book was written, filed any advis-
ory reports in Chapter Ten proceedings but it had, in cases under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act, taken a public stand in favor of the strict
priority theory and had relied heavily on the Boyd decision.2 The S. E. C. is
firmly convinced that bond holders are entitled to rely on the promies
made to them and that stockholders are supposed to bear the brunt of the
risks of enterprise. It feels that it has a mission: to establish in reorganiza-
tion proceedings a practice which will be consistent with the expectations of
investors before reorganization. Quite naturally, the simplification of admin-
istrative problems also stands as a not unimportant reason for the strict
priority theory. Despite the cogency of these reasons, there is yet a bit to
be said for the relative priority theory. The fact that stocks and bonds are
treated very much alike in the investment mart.3 the belief of mu st stock-
holders that they are investors along with bondholders in a corporate enter-
prise and that the risks they bear are those attending profit earnings and
dividend payments are realities that cannot be easily vaporized. Perhaps of
equal significance are reasons which do not lend themselves to expression
in conventional legal terminology and which can be articulated only in terms
of solicitude for stockholders and a reluctance to freeze them out. After all,
a reorganization-and not a dissolution-is involved. In this pathological
situation, no one who invested in the going concern should be excluded from
some share, however speculative and small, in the rehabilitation. The elimina-
tion of junior securities, simply because it smacks of liquidation, seems pecu-
liarly foreign to a rehabilitation enterprise and harsh to stockholders, stock-
holders viewed as individuals rather than as unidentified masses of risk-con-
scious corporate owners.4 The argument that the expectations of stock-
holders are based on the confusion attending their treatment in reorganiza-
tions seems to overlook the changing functional status of bondholders even
before reorganization. True, bondholders were once considered credito rs
rather than investors or owners, but today, they, no less than stockholders,
perform investors' functions. While this identity of interest cannot lead to
complete identity of treatment, it creates a sufficient kinship to explain the
acceptance of the relative priority theory and the refusal to sacrifice stozk-
holders upon the altar of absolute priority. If, consequently, promises to bond-
is maintained either by the issuance of new, senior securities or by an appropriately
superior participation in, for example, one issue of stock.
2. See Meck & Gary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management Under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1938) 52 H.v. L. REv. 216, 247. After
the enactment of the Chandler Act, members of the S.E.C. voiced their views. Speech of
fr. Abe Fortas, Assistant Director, Public Utilities Division, S. E. C., before "Prac-
ticing Law Courses," (New York, July 14, 1938); Speech of Mr. Samuel Clark. Chair-
man, Corporate Reorganization Division, S. E. C, before the "Practicing Law.- Courses"
(New York, Jan. 5, 1939).
3. Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Security (1923) 37 Hnv. L Rsv. 201, 202.
4. The Commission's indifference to the fate of stockholders may in some measure
be due to its previous explorations of managerial manipulations of reorganization pro-
ceedings in their own interests and its continuing conviction that management is to ta
identified with stockholders. See the v-arious reports of the S. E. C. on Protective &
Reorganization Committees (1936-1937).
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holders are not faithfully fulfilled, an event occurs which is native to the
bankruptcy process: the impairment of contractual obligations; if this
leads to loss of faith in the bond as a secured investment, an event may
occur for which some critics eagerly hope: the abandonment of bonds as
a financing medium.5 The persistency with which the rights of bondholders
are reduced in reorganizations attests the expediency of the relative priority
theory; the resistance of courts to deny stockholders' participation suggests
a sympathy which the logic and legalisms of the Commission may not easily
overcome.
ALFRED B. TEroN t
5. Isaacs, supra note 3, at 210.
6. Typical of the entire book are the author's strong convictions and weak reasons
on this issue. Mr. Swanstrom's criticism of second circuit court cases, in which dittrict
courts were reversed for failure to observe absolute pririties, is a pious observation:
"That which is fair and useful is good and lawful, but that which is destructive is error."
P. 173.
tSterling Fellow, Yale Law School.
